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	<title>Comments for netdefences</title>
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	<link>http://netdefences.com</link>
	<description>internet security, research and politics</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 09 Oct 2011 10:13:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[Merkel&#8217;s Moment, a Schmittian emergency]]> by netdefences &#187; Blog Archive &#187; &#8220;Du sollst dich nicht erwischen lassen&#8221;</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2011/09/merkels-moment-a-schmittian-emergency/comment-page-1/#comment-6787</link>
		<dc:creator>netdefences &#187; Blog Archive &#187; &#8220;Du sollst dich nicht erwischen lassen&#8221;</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 09 Oct 2011 10:13:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/?p=238#comment-6787</guid>
		<description>[...] Margarita Mathiopoulos, &#8220;Ein Liberales Manifest&#8221;:  Es muss daher vordringliche Aufgabe freidemokratischer Politik sein, einen liberalen Wertekodex der vom Verfall bedrohten bürgerlichen Tugenden – Anstand, Sittlichkeit, Ehrlichkeit, Pflichtgefühl, Großzügigkeit, Disziplin, Fleiß – aufrechtzuhalten, um den Vormarsch der Sünden – Wollust, Gewalt, Betrug, Lüge, Laster, Selbstsucht (das 11. Gebot „du sollst dich nicht erwischen lassen“) Einhalt zu gebieten. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Margarita Mathiopoulos, &#8220;Ein Liberales Manifest&#8221;:  Es muss daher vordringliche Aufgabe freidemokratischer Politik sein, einen liberalen Wertekodex der vom Verfall bedrohten bürgerlichen Tugenden – Anstand, Sittlichkeit, Ehrlichkeit, Pflichtgefühl, Großzügigkeit, Disziplin, Fleiß – aufrechtzuhalten, um den Vormarsch der Sünden – Wollust, Gewalt, Betrug, Lüge, Laster, Selbstsucht (das 11. Gebot „du sollst dich nicht erwischen lassen“) Einhalt zu gebieten. [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[The Geopolitics of Openness]]> by netdefences &#187; Blog Archive &#187; John Healey on discussions about an international internet security treaty</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2011/09/the-geopolitics-of-openness/comment-page-1/#comment-6784</link>
		<dc:creator>netdefences &#187; Blog Archive &#187; John Healey on discussions about an international internet security treaty</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 10:21:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/?p=267#comment-6784</guid>
		<description>[...] of David Eaves&#8217; speculations about the underlying motives of the U.S., UK and the remaining Open Government Partnership [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] of David Eaves&#8217; speculations about the underlying motives of the U.S., UK and the remaining Open Government Partnership [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[Benkler on Wikileaks, media, distributed models of mutual criticism]]> by P2P Foundation &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Wikileaks And The Battle Over The Soul Of The Networked Fourth Estate</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2011/03/benkler-on-wikileaks-media-distributed-models-of-mutual-criticism/comment-page-1/#comment-6451</link>
		<dc:creator>P2P Foundation &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Wikileaks And The Battle Over The Soul Of The Networked Fourth Estate</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2011 07:53:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2011/03/benkler-on-wikileaks-media-distributed-models-of-mutual-criticism/#comment-6451</guid>
		<description>[...] netdefenses blog reviews the draft version of the forthcoming [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] netdefenses blog reviews the draft version of the forthcoming [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[NATO and its role in internet security – geopolitics of intenet security governance?]]> by Andreas Schmidt</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2011/03/nato-and-its-role-in-internet-security-%e2%80%93-geopolitics-of-intenet-security-governance/comment-page-1/#comment-3051</link>
		<dc:creator>Andreas Schmidt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Mar 2011 23:18:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2011/03/nato-and-its-role-in-internet-security-%e2%80%93-geopolitics-of-intenet-security-governance/#comment-3051</guid>
		<description>Brenden, thanks for your comments and these links connecting me to the US debate. It appears to be more advanced and harsher that what is happening here in Europe. (I&#039;ll blog about that in more detail, later.)
Organisations have their agenda, act based on their culture, their official mission. Michael Barnett/Liv Coleman wrote this telling &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.jstor.org/pss/3693502&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;analysis on Interpol&lt;/a&gt; about how Interpol tried to get through years of uncertainty when their raison d&#039;être was questioned by many, how they mingled through, looking for new missions, proposing them to its stakeholders who would in the end decide over Interpol&#039;s existence. It&#039;s likely a safe bet to assume that ITU&#039;s behaviour in internet governance provides useful empirics for a similar study. 
The question about which organisations should be in control includes some fundamental political consequences. While I get some of the points proposed by the Rockefeller bill, I have some troubles imagining the operationalisation of joint defence of civilian and military networks without massive risks for privacy, openness, freedom of communication etc.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Brenden, thanks for your comments and these links connecting me to the US debate. It appears to be more advanced and harsher that what is happening here in Europe. (I&#8217;ll blog about that in more detail, later.)<br />
Organisations have their agenda, act based on their culture, their official mission. Michael Barnett/Liv Coleman wrote this telling <a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/3693502" rel="nofollow">analysis on Interpol</a> about how Interpol tried to get through years of uncertainty when their raison d&#8217;être was questioned by many, how they mingled through, looking for new missions, proposing them to its stakeholders who would in the end decide over Interpol&#8217;s existence. It&#8217;s likely a safe bet to assume that ITU&#8217;s behaviour in internet governance provides useful empirics for a similar study.<br />
The question about which organisations should be in control includes some fundamental political consequences. While I get some of the points proposed by the Rockefeller bill, I have some troubles imagining the operationalisation of joint defence of civilian and military networks without massive risks for privacy, openness, freedom of communication etc.</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[NATO and its role in internet security – geopolitics of intenet security governance?]]> by Brenden Kuerbis</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2011/03/nato-and-its-role-in-internet-security-%e2%80%93-geopolitics-of-intenet-security-governance/comment-page-1/#comment-3028</link>
		<dc:creator>Brenden Kuerbis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2011 16:36:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2011/03/nato-and-its-role-in-internet-security-%e2%80%93-geopolitics-of-intenet-security-governance/#comment-3028</guid>
		<description>Hi Andreas,

Interesting post, thanks, glad someone is following these developments closely.  You couldn&#039;t be more right when saying &quot;National and international security organisations (think of police, military, departments of justice and interior etc) however perceive the situation influenced by their organisation’s agenda.&quot;  Case in point, is the ongoing power struggle among gov&#039;t agencies in Washington DC to determine which one should be in control of regulating security for the Internet&#039;s &quot;critical infrastructure&quot;.  See e.g., http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/152145-commerce-postpones-cybersecurity-hearing and http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/150119-langevin-introduces-cybersecurity-bill?utm_campaign=HilliconValley&amp;utm_source=twitterfeed&amp;utm_medium=twitter  I think you would agree that how these debates relate to geopolitics of Internet governance (e.g., optics to those outside of US, long term effects on global Internet standards etc.) is under appreciated.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Andreas,</p>
<p>Interesting post, thanks, glad someone is following these developments closely.  You couldn&#8217;t be more right when saying &#8220;National and international security organisations (think of police, military, departments of justice and interior etc) however perceive the situation influenced by their organisation’s agenda.&#8221;  Case in point, is the ongoing power struggle among gov&#8217;t agencies in Washington DC to determine which one should be in control of regulating security for the Internet&#8217;s &#8220;critical infrastructure&#8221;.  See e.g., <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/152145-commerce-postpones-cybersecurity-hearing" rel="nofollow">http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/152145-commerce-postpones-cybersecurity-hearing</a> and <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/150119-langevin-introduces-cybersecurity-bill?utm_campaign=HilliconValley&#038;utm_source=twitterfeed&#038;utm_medium=twitter" rel="nofollow">http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/150119-langevin-introduces-cybersecurity-bill?utm_campaign=HilliconValley&#038;utm_source=twitterfeed&#038;utm_medium=twitter</a>  I think you would agree that how these debates relate to geopolitics of Internet governance (e.g., optics to those outside of US, long term effects on global Internet standards etc.) is under appreciated.</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[Wikipedia fosters &#8220;a new form of gatekeeping&#8221; and is an &#8220;adhocracy&#8221;]]> by Andre Oboler</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/10/wikipedia-fosters-a-new-form-of-gatekeeping-and-is-an-adhocracy/comment-page-1/#comment-1169</link>
		<dc:creator>Andre Oboler</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 Oct 2010 09:40:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/10/wikipedia-fosters-a-new-form-of-gatekeeping-and-is-an-adhocracy/#comment-1169</guid>
		<description>Hi Andreas,

Thanks for the review. The main contribution of the paper was actually the evidence of systematic bias and particularly the way information removal is used to facilitate this. I&#039;m hoping others will comment on the types of Wikipedia users we have introduced and suggests focused ways of combating the problems some types of uses intentionally introduce.

Happy to receive any further thoughts you have over e-mail.

- Andre</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Andreas,</p>
<p>Thanks for the review. The main contribution of the paper was actually the evidence of systematic bias and particularly the way information removal is used to facilitate this. I&#8217;m hoping others will comment on the types of Wikipedia users we have introduced and suggests focused ways of combating the problems some types of uses intentionally introduce.</p>
<p>Happy to receive any further thoughts you have over e-mail.</p>
<p>- Andre</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[1&amp;1, Gamballa, botnets, and quantitave internet security research]]> by Andreas Schmidt</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/comment-page-1/#comment-1143</link>
		<dc:creator>Andreas Schmidt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 17:13:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/#comment-1143</guid>
		<description>Thanks for your very insightful comments, Alfred. They&#039;ll be quite helpful for future research and it sounds like it&#039;s going to be an interesting challenge to build a bullet-proof model of botnet-resilience on the level of individual ISPs.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for your very insightful comments, Alfred. They&#8217;ll be quite helpful for future research and it sounds like it&#8217;s going to be an interesting challenge to build a bullet-proof model of botnet-resilience on the level of individual ISPs.</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[1&amp;1, Gamballa, botnets, and quantitave internet security research]]> by Alfred Mabuse</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/comment-page-1/#comment-1134</link>
		<dc:creator>Alfred Mabuse</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 12:54:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/#comment-1134</guid>
		<description>Hi,
I&#039;m more than happy to fully agree with you on here.
The point we both wanted to raise was the subjectivity of statistics. I just felt compelled to comment on the original article as it appeared to me more as an afterthought than the main point.
Getting to hard facts as to how botnet-resilient or not an ISP is will be very hard in a landscape where we have to deal with resale etc. The most honest thing to do when concentrating on Access-Spam would be to remove the big resellers from the list and add an annotation to list as well as the most active resale-backends.
The problem is worsened by the fact that the resale-backend-providers will happily assign the same IP to one of their own customers and a resale customer within 24h -- impossible to separate those at any stage in the process of data collection and analysis.
When trying to distinguish ordinary spam from botnet-spam the notion of unique spam sources seems (as used in the above statistic) to be highly relevant.
So please disregard anything I wrote about mailsystems as I was referring to the fact that each of them may hide an unknown number of unique spam sources (in a broader sense).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi,<br />
I&#8217;m more than happy to fully agree with you on here.<br />
The point we both wanted to raise was the subjectivity of statistics. I just felt compelled to comment on the original article as it appeared to me more as an afterthought than the main point.<br />
Getting to hard facts as to how botnet-resilient or not an ISP is will be very hard in a landscape where we have to deal with resale etc. The most honest thing to do when concentrating on Access-Spam would be to remove the big resellers from the list and add an annotation to list as well as the most active resale-backends.<br />
The problem is worsened by the fact that the resale-backend-providers will happily assign the same IP to one of their own customers and a resale customer within 24h &#8212; impossible to separate those at any stage in the process of data collection and analysis.<br />
When trying to distinguish ordinary spam from botnet-spam the notion of unique spam sources seems (as used in the above statistic) to be highly relevant.<br />
So please disregard anything I wrote about mailsystems as I was referring to the fact that each of them may hide an unknown number of unique spam sources (in a broader sense).</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[1&amp;1, Gamballa, botnets, and quantitave internet security research]]> by Damballa zieht offensichtlich fehlerhafte Statistik zurück &#124; 1&#38;1 Blog</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/comment-page-1/#comment-1133</link>
		<dc:creator>Damballa zieht offensichtlich fehlerhafte Statistik zurück &#124; 1&#38;1 Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 12:54:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/#comment-1133</guid>
		<description>[...] der Identifizierung infizierter Systeme betreiben wir einen sehr großen Aufwand und arbeiten hier mit diversen, namhaften Botnetz-Experten zusammen. Sobald wir einen betroffenen [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] der Identifizierung infizierter Systeme betreiben wir einen sehr großen Aufwand und arbeiten hier mit diversen, namhaften Botnetz-Experten zusammen. Sobald wir einen betroffenen [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[1&amp;1, Gamballa, botnets, and quantitave internet security research]]> by Andreas Schmidt</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/comment-page-1/#comment-1132</link>
		<dc:creator>Andreas Schmidt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 11:08:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/#comment-1132</guid>
		<description>That is one of the points I intended to make here. Do statistical graphs represent social and technological realities in a useful way? Given the graph shown above, you could very well think that 1&amp;1 can now legitimately be called the ISP that is best in dealing with bots (I&#039;m not talking about CnC server, that&#039;s a different story). The difference between 1&amp;1 and other ISPs is so striking that I would like to see these graphs be backed up (or falsified) by more qualitative analysis before stating that 1&amp;1 puts its competitors and the whole remaining industry to shame in anti-botnetting. And furthermore, the graph just divides the number of unique spam sources by the number of subscribers. The question you raised whether this is a fair and appropriate way to represent the anti-botnet performance of an ISP is a legitimate one.

The research this data was used for didn&#039;t only cover Germany and compared German ISPs, but a good deal more countries and their ISPs. Hence, the focus for the statistical model used in the study might not have been to ensure fair comparison of anti-botnet performance among distinct ISPs in one country. Your input may help to adopt the existing model and take all the points into consideration you&#039;ve mentioned above. If your criticism is valid. Let’s go to the details. 

(The following arguments are based on a conversation I just had with Hadi Asghari, who is currently attending a workshop an therefore can’t comment here.)

The question about where 1&amp;1 access customers are listed is a tough one, indeed, and needs to be answered. It is nevertheless correct that at this point an ASN is not broken down on the national level. The simple reason for this is that such detailed IP-range information was not available. If you have such information and are willing to provide it, the stats will happily be recalculated. 

The identification of spam sources is based on logged IP addresses of the spam connection on the spam-trap. Hence, faking headers will not change the results. In addition, spam coming through the mail system is counted. But in fact, when looking at bot infections, access spam might be more relevant.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That is one of the points I intended to make here. Do statistical graphs represent social and technological realities in a useful way? Given the graph shown above, you could very well think that 1&#038;1 can now legitimately be called the ISP that is best in dealing with bots (I&#8217;m not talking about CnC server, that&#8217;s a different story). The difference between 1&#038;1 and other ISPs is so striking that I would like to see these graphs be backed up (or falsified) by more qualitative analysis before stating that 1&#038;1 puts its competitors and the whole remaining industry to shame in anti-botnetting. And furthermore, the graph just divides the number of unique spam sources by the number of subscribers. The question you raised whether this is a fair and appropriate way to represent the anti-botnet performance of an ISP is a legitimate one.</p>
<p>The research this data was used for didn&#8217;t only cover Germany and compared German ISPs, but a good deal more countries and their ISPs. Hence, the focus for the statistical model used in the study might not have been to ensure fair comparison of anti-botnet performance among distinct ISPs in one country. Your input may help to adopt the existing model and take all the points into consideration you&#8217;ve mentioned above. If your criticism is valid. Let’s go to the details. </p>
<p>(The following arguments are based on a conversation I just had with Hadi Asghari, who is currently attending a workshop an therefore can’t comment here.)</p>
<p>The question about where 1&#038;1 access customers are listed is a tough one, indeed, and needs to be answered. It is nevertheless correct that at this point an ASN is not broken down on the national level. The simple reason for this is that such detailed IP-range information was not available. If you have such information and are willing to provide it, the stats will happily be recalculated. </p>
<p>The identification of spam sources is based on logged IP addresses of the spam connection on the spam-trap. Hence, faking headers will not change the results. In addition, spam coming through the mail system is counted. But in fact, when looking at bot infections, access spam might be more relevant.</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[1&amp;1, Gamballa, botnets, and quantitave internet security research]]> by Alfred Mabuse</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/comment-page-1/#comment-1130</link>
		<dc:creator>Alfred Mabuse</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 09:25:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/10/11-gamballa-botnets-and-quantitave-internet-security-research/#comment-1130</guid>
		<description>Hi,

obviously, there must be something wrong with this statistic, too.
If the SPAM percentage of any one of the big players actually was lower than one thirtieth of the next best we would conclude
- this player should never be found on _any_ blacklist
- the abuse-department is acting over-zealous and actively harassing customers with less then perfect newsletters.
More realistically, while I have no doubt that the data itself is correct, the presentation is at least a bit biased.
First of all 1&amp;1 access-(dial-up,dsl, ...)-customers are not listed in their own AS, but in those of the reselling partners (Deutsche Telekom, O2 and probably others). On which side are they included in the number of subscribers?
Secondly, the calculation of &quot;unique SPAM sources&quot; is technically difficult and error prone. How can one be sure not to &quot;fall&quot; for every fake &quot;received&quot; header of the spammers while at the same time include all &quot;unique&quot; sources that are routed through the same mail-system?
Given these difficulties, I guess the numbers would become more meaningful if all &quot;access-spam&quot; would be disregarded completely -- some don&#039;t even regard it as &quot;real&quot; SPAM as it is obvious and easily filtered.

All in all this statistic serves more to show what can be done with seemingly objective numbers -- in which I regard it as a great addition to the discussion -- than it does tell us anything about how spammy one business is in comparison to another.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi,</p>
<p>obviously, there must be something wrong with this statistic, too.<br />
If the SPAM percentage of any one of the big players actually was lower than one thirtieth of the next best we would conclude<br />
- this player should never be found on _any_ blacklist<br />
- the abuse-department is acting over-zealous and actively harassing customers with less then perfect newsletters.<br />
More realistically, while I have no doubt that the data itself is correct, the presentation is at least a bit biased.<br />
First of all 1&amp;1 access-(dial-up,dsl, &#8230;)-customers are not listed in their own AS, but in those of the reselling partners (Deutsche Telekom, O2 and probably others). On which side are they included in the number of subscribers?<br />
Secondly, the calculation of &#8220;unique SPAM sources&#8221; is technically difficult and error prone. How can one be sure not to &#8220;fall&#8221; for every fake &#8220;received&#8221; header of the spammers while at the same time include all &#8220;unique&#8221; sources that are routed through the same mail-system?<br />
Given these difficulties, I guess the numbers would become more meaningful if all &#8220;access-spam&#8221; would be disregarded completely &#8212; some don&#8217;t even regard it as &#8220;real&#8221; SPAM as it is obvious and easily filtered.</p>
<p>All in all this statistic serves more to show what can be done with seemingly objective numbers &#8212; in which I regard it as a great addition to the discussion &#8212; than it does tell us anything about how spammy one business is in comparison to another.</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[Limits of commons-based peer production at Wikipedia]]> by Andreas Schmidt</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/09/limits-of-commons-based-peer-production-at-wikipedia/comment-page-1/#comment-834</link>
		<dc:creator>Andreas Schmidt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Sep 2010 19:47:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/09/limits-of-commons-based-peer-production-at-wikipedia/#comment-834</guid>
		<description>I didn&#039;t say that your four-square-matrix isn&#039;t good. I was just bemused by the fact that only two days before another economist told me that he - like probably every economist - was very fond of those matrices. I slightly begrudge you guys this ability because the world always looks to complicated for me to box it into four squares.
Thx. for the link.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I didn&#8217;t say that your four-square-matrix isn&#8217;t good. I was just bemused by the fact that only two days before another economist told me that he &#8211; like probably every economist &#8211; was very fond of those matrices. I slightly begrudge you guys this ability because the world always looks to complicated for me to box it into four squares.<br />
Thx. for the link.</p>
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		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[Limits of commons-based peer production at Wikipedia]]> by Leonhard</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/09/limits-of-commons-based-peer-production-at-wikipedia/comment-page-1/#comment-828</link>
		<dc:creator>Leonhard</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Sep 2010 07:52:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/09/limits-of-commons-based-peer-production-at-wikipedia/#comment-828</guid>
		<description>Thank you for your summary above and at the CPOV website. With regard to the four-square-matrix, I think you are quite right that this is not the best and final solution, we are still working on this one.

Interestingly, founding foundations seems to become more and more the way to go in the realm of commons-based peer production, as is evidenced by the newly founded &quot;The Document Foundation&quot; (see &lt;a href=&quot;http://governancexborders.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/the-foundation-model-openoffice-following-wikimedias-example/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;The Foundation Model&lt;/a&gt;).

Hope to stay in touch!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you for your summary above and at the CPOV website. With regard to the four-square-matrix, I think you are quite right that this is not the best and final solution, we are still working on this one.</p>
<p>Interestingly, founding foundations seems to become more and more the way to go in the realm of commons-based peer production, as is evidenced by the newly founded &#8220;The Document Foundation&#8221; (see <a href="http://governancexborders.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/the-foundation-model-openoffice-following-wikimedias-example/" rel="nofollow">The Foundation Model</a>).</p>
<p>Hope to stay in touch!</p>
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	<item>
		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[Script for turning messy texts into well-structured, -outlined and -formatted Word documents]]> by Ralf Bendrath</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/06/script-turn-messy-text-into-well-structured-doc/comment-page-1/#comment-320</link>
		<dc:creator>Ralf Bendrath</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Jun 2010 23:53:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/?p=134#comment-320</guid>
		<description>Thou shall not procrastinate!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thou shall not procrastinate!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on <![CDATA[Nagging questions in cybersecurity research]]> by netdefences &#187; Blog Archive &#187; The security risk of bad security-provisioning design</title>
		<link>http://netdefences.com/2010/04/nagging-questions-in-cybersecurity-research/comment-page-1/#comment-306</link>
		<dc:creator>netdefences &#187; Blog Archive &#187; The security risk of bad security-provisioning design</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Jun 2010 16:28:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://netdefences.com/2010/04/nagging-questions-in-cybersecurity-research/#comment-306</guid>
		<description>[...] pointed out earlier some of the research questions for social scientific internet governance research. The main issues [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] pointed out earlier some of the research questions for social scientific internet governance research. The main issues [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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