And then you read an update by the commercial community of technical experts on Industrial Control Systems. According to their assessment, the ICS industry acts deaf and akin to the automotive industry in “Fight Club” (mentioned in the scene in which the automotive white-collar insomniac protagonists meets Tyler Durden on the airplane): it’s cheaper to let systems go bust occasionally and pay for some clean-up than to preventively fix the systems. Industrial control systems are still highly buggy, a group of ICS security researchers around the consultancy Digitalbond have tried to showcase at their SCADA Security Scientific Symposium (S4). For experts in the field, this is common knowledge for more than a decade.

The technical ICS geniuses at the S4 conference put all the blame to the vendors, such as Siemens, General Electric, Schneider Modicon, Rockwell Automation, SEL, or Koyo Automation. But is that easy? My experience from general IT, not ICS admittedly, tells me that life is more complicated. Independent consultancies, which are bound to specific vendors, have certainly no incentive to blame existing or prospective customers. More substantially, while there might be customers with inadequate security procedures out there, I highly doubt that knowledge about notorious insecurity of a particular set of artefacts doesn’t exist somewhere in customer companies and doesn’t climb up the communication ladder to the CIOs or CSOs. If owners are not interested in getting their 20-years old ICS fixed, a vendor interested in subsequent orders wouldn’t want to embarrass itself and its clients by being utterly explicit about the risks or the security hick-ups of the installed base of legacy systems.

The financial sector and the nuclear industry serve as nice role models for dealing with, as we institutional-economics-infected researchers call it, negative externalities of societal or technical systems. For both system vendors and owners of such infrastructures, inactivity is a viable option to respond to publication of vulnerabilities. Why would you want to spend millions on hardening your chemical facilities against a rather hostile hack into its control systems? If shit hits the fan, writing off your production site and transferring the external costs to the public is probably the most economic approach. Just make sure that the downfall of one site doesn’t bring down the complete parent group as with this TEPCO guys who failed to install proper economic firewalls inside their group. There are no columns or rows for the rhetoric of cyber-warfare in the Excel sheets on which executive boards of infrastructure owners rely in their decision making. The ongoing installation of insecure systems and components is certainly is worrying.

The great potential realigner of incentives aka public authorities have have remained rather calm on this issue, too. For Europe, Kroes is gunning for “providing the right incentives“, but we don’t know yet what the Commission will come up with eventually. Hohlmaier, rapporteur of the European Parliament on Cybersecurity issues and with a constituency in Siemens land, has been likewise silent on this, Google tells us. Inaction by incompetent or unwilling operators of information and industrial infrastructures might pose risks for the public at large. The public might want to live with some risks. Or prefer to have incentives realigned, i.e. get regulations installed that force vendors, customers or third parties to invest into security measures. For the last couple of years, policy makers, researchers and public authorities have been obsessed with “incentivising” third parties such as ISPs to make up for the failures of vendors and customers of ICT systems. For industrial control systems, I don’t see this option. It’s either the vendors and/or the customers (owners of infrastructures) that need to take the bill. Or learn to live with the risks. Just like we did with financial and nuclear systems.

Hippie global meliorism is Marxism without the House of War. It wills an end that can only be realized through means of violence. Yet they refuse to will the means. If laughter could be projected from an ocean and half a continent away, they’d hear Marx’s disembodied laughter drumming from the British Museum and echoing down their spine with Teutonic clarity. A classical Marxist revolutionary would do something revolutionary. They’d mass at the park, loot the city’s financial district, and then storm the state capital. The hippies did everything backwards: they retreated from the center of political power, abstained from seizing the center of economic power, and massed in an out-of-the-way outdoor drug/farmers market.

Old Karl would die of laughter.

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Similar IO attacks could be conducted against nation states that have violated international treaties in order to carry out as uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons. Most of the unauthorized enrichment facilities in these cases are constructed deep underground. Conventional munitions, including bunker busters, could have difficulty penetrating and damaging these hardened structures. Cyber munitions, however, could be used to destroy key equipment used in the enrichment process. One of the primary IO targets would be the gas centrifuges used to create weapons grade uranium. The rotors within these centrifuges operate at extremely high speeds (e.g. 50,000 RPM). A cyber attack that increased the RPMs beyond normal safely levels could result in a catastrophic failure of a single centri- fuge. Implementing this IO attack across thousands of centri- fuges has the potential to disrupt enrichment operations for considerable periods of time.

A couple of months before Stuxnet broke news.

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In my eyes, this seems to be another step by U.S. officials, without exactly coming out and saying it, to label Anonymous as a cyber terrorist organization, bent on indiscriminate destruction of digital property and infrastructure.

The DHS in the “National Cybersecurity and Communications Integrations Center Bulletin”, A-0020-NCCIC / ICS-CERT –120020110916:

“The loosely organized hacking collective known as Anonymous has recently expressed an interest in targeting industrial control systems (ICS). (…) Anonymous’ increased interest may indicate intent to develop an offensive ICS capability in the future.”

Kaplan continues, on Duqu, the alleged Stuxnet offspring:

Which reminds me: I’m waiting for DHS to publish a warning based on a potential real critical infrastructure issue that popped up just yesterday — evidence that the Stuxnet authors are back with new malware. I’m sure the bulletin will arrive any minute now.

Even a year after, Langner sticks to his assessment:

Thinking about it for another minute, if it’s not aliens, it’s got to be the United States.

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This is indeed going to be huge, potentially at least. We have seen plenty of these geeky apps and web sites that make use of publicly available data and create some clever mashups. The usual meme of Open Data advocacy is that it fosters transparency, openness, enhances citizens’ say in public matters and thereby strengthens democracy and what else. For all this open data hipness and siren songs, it remains to be seen whether the advantages will be evenly distributed among citizens, who might receive enhanced or innovative public and non-public services, entrepreneurs entering the markets with some fresh and bright ideas bureaucrats haven’t thought of and ICT behemoths, which most likely will seize the opportunity and kick outtasking into new spheres to sell software, iron and services.

A litmus test to the openness and transparency rhetoric is, as always, the area of security. Will there be a section in COM’s portal labelled “internet security” or “cyber security”? In Brussels, the draft Directive on “judicial cooperation … on combatting attacks against information systems” is still under consideration. Article 15, paragraph 3 states:

Member States shall transmit the data collected according to this Article to the Commission. They shall also ensure that a consolidated review of these statistical reports is published.

Here we have a perfect opportunity for the EC to display its willingness for openness of public sector data. In addition to merely releasing consolidated statistics about the internet-based crimes, a more open approach appears to be perfectly feasible. We still lack reliable, deep knowledge about the scale of the internet security problem. Publicly accessible data will be very helpful to overcome this deficiency and thus to provide the knowledge base for sound political decisions.

Open Data often tends to focus on low-hanging fruits such as geographic data, administrative documents and similar kinds of public service raw data. The one and only area however that truly impacts transparency of governmental action is security. Security is often is grotesquely secretive, security organisation shielded from public scrutiny. With legitimate force entirely concentrated in their hands, these institutions both protect citizens and society, but also, by definition, pose a threat once organisational culture, political oversight and political independence become non-optimal. Hence, democratic governance requires security organisations that are open to public oversight to the maximum degree possible without endangering societal security interests.

While Open Data “merely” requires to add public interfaces to existing data warehouses, Open Security Data admittedly needs a thorough analysis on which data is safe for publication and which isn’t. It shouldn’t be that hard though to make statistical cyber-crime databases public. For a start.

Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war. That is its true significance, and all the speculation about its target and its source should not blind us to that larger reality. We have crossed a threshold, and there is no turning back.

Nice alteration to recently excavated rhetoric corpse of the Digital Pearl Harbour by the Washington Post. “Hiroshima of cyber-war” is an allegory conveying ideas and association probably not intended by the author:

• The dawn of a new age of geopolitics defined by control over certain technological artefacts.
• The assumption by US security circles that unilateral and sole control over these artefacts equals incontestable geopolitical power, a truly “unipolar moment” (Charles Krauthammer) that should have lasted considerably longer than 1949 when the Soviets managed to assemble their “Fat Man” equivalent.
• The militarisation and secretisation of a potentially benevolent technology.
• The institution of a nuclear umbrella which served as a foreign policy instrument and “provided a cooperative structure, linking the United States in a mutually beneficial way to a wide range of friends, allies, and neutral nations.” (Nye/Owens 1996, p. 26)

A Hiroshima of cyberwar?

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The Foreign Secretary revealed that Britain has developed new weapons to counter the threat from computer hackers and is prepared to strike first to defend the nation’s infrastructure and businesses. … The Government is investing an extra £650 million to develop deterrents to hostile viruses and hackers.

Joe Grand, grandideastudio.com:

My idealistic view of hacker is someone that is always asking questions, learning and has a thirst for knowledge. A hacker tries things that other people think are impossible and it’s someone that solves problems in a clever way.

Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung:

Wie der Staatstrojaner zerlegt wurde: Die Hacker vom Chaos Computer Club haben die Überwachungssoftware gefunden, analysiert – und gehackt.
(Reverse engineering a state trojan: Hackers of the CCC found, analysed and hacked the surveillance software.)

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As part of their intelligence-gathering operation, the group gained access to a listserv used by Occupy Wall Street organizers called September17discuss. On September17discuss, organizers hash out tactics and plan events, conduct post-mortems of media appearances, and trade the latest protest gossip. On Friday, Ryan leaked thousands of September17discuss emails to conservative blogger Andrew Breitbart, who is now using them to try to smear Occupy Wall Street as an anarchist conspiracy to disrupt global markets.

What may much more alarming to Occupy Wall Street organizers is that while Ryan was monitoring September17discuss, he was forwarding interesting email threads to contacts at the NYPD and FBI, including special agent Jordan T. Loyd, a member of the FBI’s New York-based cyber security team. (…) …Loyd cited Occupy Wall Street as an example of a “newly emerging threat to U.S. information systems.”

The incident highlights structural weaknesses of open collaborative platforms in social environments with detrimental perceptions and interests. A group that wants to become a mass movement doesn’t have the choice of operating and planning in secrecy. Nor does it have the means to sanction – from the perspective of the group – anti-social behaviour. At yet another frontier, Generation Openness is learning the hard way that sharing can come with costs. It’ll be interesting to observe the institutional innovations, the OWS movement will inevitably come up with.

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Although the attacks on Estonia—one of the world’s most wired countries—did not involve physical attack, virtually the whole country came to a standstill as banks, communications, and government fell victim to cyberattacks.

It did not come to a standstill. Whenever an article starts with this meme, enjoy the line of argument ahead. Like this one:

“Just as organized crime groups have hired hackers, it is possible that nation states could hire or distantly support jihad networks and launch cyber-attacks through them,” states an April 17 report from Project Cyber Dawn, part of The Cyber Security Forum Initiative.

I guess the story the author wants to convey is: Botnets can bring down a country (Estonia, Georgia), there is an underground market for botnets, you can rent a botnet from a criminal group or person, you can “weaponize” a botnet, elite hacker groups can consist of jihadists. Hence you can bring down the US or one of its allies by renting a botnet from jihadists.

What you could read is: Estonia was not brought down to a standstill – thanks to the intervention of some capable, mostly local IT experts –, even though it’s a small country with just 1.3 m inhabitants.

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Vulnerabilities facing the energy industries include:

* Those created in the operating environment by the rapid proliferation of industry-wide information systems based on open-system architectures, centralized operations, increased communications over public telecommunications networks and remote maintenance

Earlier this week, Terry Zink quoted the following in a blog post:

Despite investments into state of the art technology, a majority of the oil and gas industry remain blissfully unaware of the vulnerabilities, threats and capability of a malicious cyber attack on control systems.

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But administration officials and even some military officers balked, fearing that it might set a precedent for other nations, in particular Russia or China, to carry out such offensives of their own, and questioning whether the attack could be mounted on such short notice. …

“We don’t want to be the ones who break the glass on this new kind of warfare,” said James Andrew Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he specializes in technology and national security. …

“These cybercapabilities are still like the Ferrari that you keep in the garage and only take out for the big race and not just for a run around town, unless nothing else can get you there,” said one Obama administration official briefed on the discussions. … 

Some officials also expressed concern about revealing American technological capabilities to potential enemies for what seemed like a relatively minor security threat to the United States.

Read: Cyber-attack capabilities are built up in the shadows, quantity and quality unknown, to be used only in conflicts on the ‘vital-interest’-level – or as yet another deterrence (the attribution problem aside).

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On page 18 of that report, they list similarities between Stuxnet and Duqu. But how many generic pieces of malware have those same similarities as Stuxnet? Is this just an example of the Barnum effect (like that one South Park episode where Stan Marsh talked to the dead and John Edward won the BDIU award)? For all I know, half the malware out there can be classified as similar to Stuxnet.

…

Are Stuxnet and Duqu related?  I don’t know.

Symantec calls the malware “The precursor to the next Stuxnet“. Good malware analysis marketing.

Duqu’s purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from entities such as industrial control system manufacturers in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party. The attackers are looking for information such as design documents that could help them mount a future attack on an industrial control facility.

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A “senior” participant remarked:

“It is so big it does my head in.”

But why? The author notes:

“Because this stuff is all mashed up. The interconnectedness of cyberspace breaks down borders and distinctions around which societies and states are organised.

It mashes up people and geography. …

Cyber mashes up functions. …

Cyber mashes up the trivial and the critical. …

It mashes up weapons. …

Finally, the internet mashes up state and private … “

Release often, release early:

By definition we need international co-operation. … So we should start with something small and build out. I see it as a quilt, a patchwork…  The role of NGOs, think-tank and private experts in sensitising governments, without it seeming a form of electronic imperialism, is important.

The role of states:

Whatever the threat, it seems to me that the private sector will be involved in almost all responses. One working group made the point that “knowledge implies more responsibility”.

Indeed, indeed. Operationally, cyber security rests on those who control the components that make up the internet.

In any case, it is hard to translate rules and practices of war. Two examples: – Is private industry ready to be the warfighter? – How do you put red crosses on hospitals and orphanages? Do we have to put them on separate networks, ie, create a “dot.humanitarian” domain? Here we start to move into polders. Should we create “dot.secure” areas? People are willing to give up a lot of privacy in social networking. It seems to me that they would be wiling to do it for security.

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“We should not wait for our own Prince of Wales moment in cyberspace.”

Now, that’s disturbing. Virtual Pearl Harbour no more. Welcome to: Oh, that I were a bot upon that machine that I might touch that juicy data? Well, I shouldn’t start reading articles at their very last paragraph. The second last comes to rescue.

In 1941, the British sent their most modern battleship, the Prince of Wales, to Southeast Asia to deter a Japanese attack on Singapore. … It took Japanese bombers 10 minutes to put an end to their fantasy, to the Prince of Wales, and to hundreds of brave sailors’ lives.

Besides that, the message is:

But the lesson of all this for the lawyers and the diplomats is stark: Their effort to impose limits on cyberwar is almost certainly doomed.

Therefore, cyber strategies are necessary:

The offense must be powerful enough to deter every adversary with something to lose in cyberspace, so it must include a way to identify attackers with certainty. The defense, too, must be realistic, making successful cyberattacks more difficult and less effective because resilience and redundancy has been built into U.S. infrastructure.

How to identify attackers with certainty without fundamentally altering the architecture of the internet or the ability to enforce collaboration of intermediaries such as ISPs worldwide? The latter could be accomplished in several ways: a) by foreign governments as a proxy, convinced by diplomatic influence ad-hoc or by institutions such as international treaties; or b) by supportive worldwide technical communities.

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While government and industry figures all agree that hacktivism — no matter the colour or stripe — poses a real security threat to organisations, opinion is divided on the motivations, and hence seriousness of groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec. (…) however, two schools of thought have emerged on who these groups really are. The first argues that these groups are simply teenagers doing what teenagers do: Rebel. The other school argues that in line with the digital saturation of the current generation of teens and twenty-somethings these acts of hacking are simply the modern day equivalent of street protests.

If it’s the equivalent of street protest, why is it “a real security threat”?

Australian Federal Police (AFP) High Tech Crime Operations Acting National Manager, Grant Edwards is quoted:

“Hacktivism may be similar to other forms of legitimate demonstration or protest; however it can have significant implications… The AFP and other Australian law enforcement authorities will not tolerate the attempts of hackers to damage or destroy Australian individuals, companies and national infrastructure resources.”

Autralia’s Attorney General office:

the Government does not consider ‘hacktivisim’ or other similar activity that disrupts the confidentiality, integrity or availability of electronic information to be a legitimate form of protest

Human-bot driven DDoS attacks, aka virtual sit-ins. are legal in Germany. They disrupt the availability of electronic information, just as sit-ins have disrupted transactions of nukes to their launching sites and of used nuclear fuel to interim or permanent disposal site. Mass public display of discontent in the physical world always implies the non-availability of some services. Applying the classic computer science definition of ICT security (confidentiality, integrity or availability of data) to the political sphere and to what societies perceive as threats to their security, has great potential to result in a technocratic order.

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